Infrared-guided, radar-guided, and dual-mode guided missiles are deployed, for example, to attack maritime targets, such as ships, or other objects on land or in the air. After they have been launched, these missiles or rockets are initially guided into the target area by an inertial sensor system (e.g., German published application DE 196 01 165 A1, published on Jul. 17, 1997, which corresponds to British Patent Application GB 2 309 070) or by GPS. The missile enters a search phase after it has come within a suitably short distance of the target. It then locks onto the target and tracks it until impact (track phase). A track gate depth D is about 150 m in older missiles but only a few meters in modern missiles.
To spoof guided missiles of this type, different types of decoys are used to protect objects by hindering the missile by interference with its function. When a threat has been detected, some decoys emit electromagnetic decoy signals (German published application DE 100 16 781 C2, published Oct. 25, 2001), while others form “clouds” of floating dipoles (chaff clouds), which are tuned to the radar frequency of the missile.
Variants of these floating dipoles include, for example, (radar) confusion decoys, (radar) seduction decoys and (radar) distraction decoys. A confusion decoy is deployed at a great distance between the object to be protected (ship) and the attacker, generally as a preventive measure before the missile is launched. When a large number of these decoys is deployed, the enemy's search is confused, because decoy targets are produced alongside the actual target object. A seduction (deflection) decoy is deployed during a missile attack after the missile has locked onto the target. In order to deflect the missile, these decoys have, for example, a higher radar reflection cross section than the object itself. These decoys are activated within a track gate with the aim of producing their effect there. Distraction decoys, on the other hand, are activated in an early stage of a missile attack, in any event, before lock-on. The distance from the object must be greater than the track gate of the missile. This guarantees that the missile, on its track to the object, initially acquires the decoy that is offered to it as the target.
German published application DE 196 17 701 A1, published on Nov. 11, 1997, which corresponds to U.S. Pat. No. 5,835,051 discloses a method for producing a false target. With this method, infrared-guided, radar-guided and dual-mode guided missiles are guided away from the actual target to a phantom target. By using a specific ratio of dipole mass to flare mass, the dipoles are swirled by the combustion of the flares. The masses are fired in submunitions in such a way that by adjustment of the delay times, the disintegration and ejection process occurs at a distance of about 10 to 60 m from the launcher, so that the effective masses act within the reduced range gates of the target-seeking heads. A decoy of this type is disclosed in German published application DE 199 51 767 C2, published on May 10, 2001, which corresponds to U.S. Pat. No. 6,513,438.
German published application DE 102 30 939 A1, published on Feb. 12, 2004, discloses a method and a device for protecting fighting vehicles from threatening weapons which use the electromagnetic spectrum from the ultraviolet range, through the visible range and the infrared range, to the radar range for target recognition and/or target acquisition and/or weapon guidance.
German published application DE 101 02 599 A1, published on Aug. 14, 2002, discloses chaff with a broadband effect over the entire radar frequency range of 0.1 to 1,000 GHz, which consists of conductive or nonconductive fibers with a conductive coating. Other IR-reflecting and/or radar-reflecting masses, etc., are given in the prior-art document German published application DE 102 30 939 A1 published on Feb. 12, 2004.
However, modern guided missiles are capable of distinguishing chaff clouds or the like from true targets. This is generally accomplished by means of various sufficiently well-known methods, for example, by polarization and fluctuation analyses. Therefore, the effectiveness of decoys, especially distraction decoys, is no longer guaranteed in these cases.